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Abstract
Randomization is an integral part of well-designed statistical trials, and is also a required
procedure in legal systems, see Marcondes et al. (2019). This paper presents an easy
to implement randomization protocol that assures, in a formal mathematical setting, a
statistically sound, computationally efficient, cryptographycally secure, traceable and au-
ditable randomization procedure that is also resistant to collusion and manipulation by
participating agents.
Meos tam suspicione quam crimine iudico carere oportere.
My people should be free from either crime or suspicion.
Julius Caesar (62BC), in Suetonius (119CE, Sec.I.74.2).
Randomization: Bad and Good Practices
Randomization is a technique used in the design of statistical experiments: in a clinical
trial, for example, patients are randomly assigned to distinct groups receiving different
treatments with the goal of studding and contrasting their effects. Randomization is
nowadays considered a golden standard in statistical practice; its motivation is to prevent
systematic biases (like an unfair or tendentious assignment process) that could distort
(unintentionally or purposely) the conclusions of the study. For further comments on
randomization see Pearl (2000, 2004) and Stern (2008), for Bayesian perspectives see
Basu (1988) and Gelman et al. (2003). In the legal context, randomization (also known
as sortition or allotment) is routinely used for the selection of jurors or judges assigned
to a given judicial case; see Marcondes et al. (2019).
Rerandomization is the practice of rejecting and discarding (for whatever reason)
a given randomized outcome, that is subsequently replaced by a new randomization.
Repeated rerandomization can be used to completely circumvent the haphazard, un-
predictable or aimless nature of randomization, allowing a premeditated selection of a
final outcome of choice. There are advanced statistical techniques capable of blending
the best characteristics of random and intentional sampling, see for example Fossaluza
(2015), Lauretto et al. (2012, 2017), and Morgan and Rubin (2012, 2015). Nevertheless,
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rerandomization is often naively used, or abused, with the excuse of (subjectively) “avoid-
ing outcomes that do not look random enough”, see for example Bruhn and McKenzie
(2009) and Ruxton and Colegrave (2006, Sec.3.4.6). In the legal context, spurious ma-
nipulations of the randomization process are often linked to fraud, corruption and similar
maladies, see Marcondes et al. (2019) and references therein.
In order to comply with the best practices for randomization processes, Marcondes et al.
(2019) recommends the use of computer software having a long list of characteristics, for
example, being efficient and fully auditable, well-defined and understandable, sound and
flexible, secure and transparent. Such requirements are expressed by the following (re-
vised) desiderata for randomization procedures:
Given the juridical and social importance of the themata under scrutiny, we believe
that it is important to develop randomization procedures in full compliance with
the following desiderata: (a) Statistical soundness and computational efficiency,
see Hammersley and Handscomb (1964, ch.3), Haramoto et al. (2008), Knuth
(1997, ch.3), and Ripley (1987, ch.2); (b) Procedural, cryptographical and com-
putational security, see Boyar (1989), L’Ecuyer (2012), Aumasson (2017) and
Katz and Lindell (2014); (c) Complete auditability and traceability, see Haber and Stornetta
(1991), Nakamoto (2008); and Wattenhofer (2017); (d) Any attempt by partici-
pating parties or coalitions to spuriously influence the procedure should be either un-
successful or be detected, see Goldschlag and Stubblebine (1998); (e) Open-source
programming; (f) Multiple hardware platform and operating system implementation;
(g) User friendliness and transparency, see Parikh and Pauly (2012) and Stern
(2018); (h) Flexibility and adaptability for the needs and requirements of multiple
application areas (like, for example, clinical trials, selection of jury or judges in
legal proceedings, and draft lotteries), see Marcondes et al. (2019).
Such requirements conflate several complementary characteristics that may seem, at
first glance, incompatible. For example, strong security is often (but wrongly) associated
with excessive secrecy, a doctrine known as “security by obscurity”, computer routines may
be efficient but are often tough as hard to audit, and mathematically well-defined algo-
rithms may be perceived as hard to understand. The bibliographical references given in
the formerly stated desiderata for randomization procedures already hint at technologies
that can be used to achieve a fully compliant randomization procedure, most preemi-
nently, the blockchain. This is the key technology supporting modern public ledgers,
cryptocurencies, and a host of related applications.
A technical challenge for the application under scrutiny is the generation of pseudo-
random number sequences that reconcile complementary properties related to compu-
tational efficiency, statistical soundness, and cryptographic security. In this respect,
the excellent statistical and computational characteristics of modern linear recurrence
pseudo-random number generators, like Haramoto et al. (2008), can be reconciled with
the needs concerning unpredictability and cryptographic security by appropriate starts
and restarts of the linear recurrence generator. A sequence start for a linear recurrence
generator is defined by a seed specified by a vector of (typically 1 to 64) integers, while a
restart is defined by a jump-ahead or skip-ahead specified by a single integer (kept small
relative to the generator’s full period), see L’Ecuyer (2012).
Unpredictable and cryptographically secure seeds and jump-aheads can be provided
by high entropy bit streams extracted from blockchain transactions, an idea that has
already been explored in the works of Bonneau et al. (2015) and Popov (2017).
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The next section develops a possible implementation of a fully compliant core ran-
domization protocol based on blockchain technology, and also makes a simple prototype
available for study and further research1. Moreover, in order to make it simple and easy
to use, we develop the prototype on top of a readily available crypto-currency platform.
We use Bitcoin for this example, but other alternatives like Ethereum or other cryp-
tocurrencies whose miners work under the same incentives model can be used with minor
adaptations.
Core Randomization Protocol in Blockchain
We intend to establish a protocol able to deliver on demand pseudo random numbers,
from a auditable and immutable ledger. The procedure will start as follows: the user
(the part that wants to receive a random number) shall send a Bitcoin transaction with
a register of its purpose embedded2 in it. The recipient of this transaction may be
a proxy representing a competent authority, a pertinent regulatory agency, an agreed
custodian, etc. When this3 transaction is first attached to the blockchain, we concatenate
the transaction ID (a 32 bytes, hexadecimal number) and the block header (a 80 bytes,
hexadecimal number). This resulting 112 bytes hexadecimal number will be the input
for some known Verifiable Delay Function (VDF), that should be calibrated accordingly
to the purpose of the random number. For instance, a less critical purpose should have a
VDF that delays the result in just a few seconds, or even skip completely the VDF step.
A critical purpose, with significant interests involved, should have a more complex VDF,
with a delay of minutes or even hours. The final result, after the VDF, will be the source
for our seeds and jump-aheads.
With the aid of this protocol, one is able to find a different pseudo-random number
for each user that demands it. Note that the user does not have any incentive to try to
modify its transaction ID, because he does not have any control of the block header. We
assume that the user and the miner are not the same person, so a miner will only be
interested in trying to control his block header if he is paid to do so. Since the last stage
of our protocol involves the calculation of a VDF, it will take a certain amount of time
to the miner to decide if the the block he has found will be of interest of the user. Thus,
he might even lose his block, if some other miner broadcasts a block of his own before he
finishes calculating the VDF.
In the following subsection, the miner’s payoff and the necessary delay T for the
Verifiable Delay Functions will be explicitly calculated.
Preventing Collusion for Spurious Manipulation
Suppose a malicious user tries to bribe a miner that controls a fraction p of the network’s
computational power. A prize P = nB, where B is the Bitcoin block reward, will be
paid to the miner if he successfully mines what we call a "desirable block": a block that
will deliver a random number in a set A, chosen by the malicious user. Let also λ be the
average rate of incoming blocks and q the probability of a randomly generated number
1www link to be added at publication time
2One way to embed a message in a transaction is using the OP_RETURN script, which allows to
store up to 40 bytes in a transaction
3If someone tries to generate more than one transaction for a same purpose, just take the one that
was attached first.
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being an element of A, i.e., the measure of the set of desirable results for the malicious
user. Finally, let T be the expected amount of time needed for the VDF calculations. The
moment a miner finds a block that can be accepted by the network, he faces the decision
of broadcasting it before checking the VDF, or calculating the VDF before broadcasting.
If he decides to check the VDF before broadcasting, he might start another attempt to
find a block rightaway.
First, we calculate the expected absolute payoff for the first and second options, called
E1 and E2, respectively. E1 will be larger than B, since the miner might issue a desirable
block by chance:
E1 = B + qP = B(1 + nq) (1)
On the other hand, if the miner chooses to calculate the VDF, he will receive the
block reward and the prize P , but with a probability given by
E2 =(B + P )qP{no other node finding a block before t = T} (2)
+ (B + P )(1− q)P{successfully mining a desirable block in another attempt}
=B(1 + n)q exp(−(1− p)λT )
+B(1 + n)(1− q)
∞∑
i=1
P{successfully mining a desirable block after i attempts}
The probabilities inside the summation, in the last equation, can be calculated as the
product of the probability of finding a desirable block after i attempts (that will be a
geometric distribution with probability of success q) and the probability of finding and
checking i blocks before the rest of the network mines one 4, resulting:
E2 =B(1 + n)
[
q exp(−(1− p)λT ) + (1− q)
∞∑
i=1
q(1− q)i−1pi exp(−(1− p)λT )
]
=B(1 + n) exp(−(1− p)λT )
(
q +
(1− q)pq
1− p+ pq
)
(3)
Finally, in order to make accepting the bribe not lucrative, we must have E1 > E2,
i.e.:
λT >
1
1− p
log
(
1 + n
1 + nq
q
1− p+ pq
)
(4)
Since for every n > 0 we have 1+n
1+nq
< 1
q
, if we choose λT ∗ = 1
1−p
log
(
1
q
q
1−p+pq
)
, we
guarantee that the attack will not be lucrative for any bribe P = nB. Also, since it can
be assumed that p < 1/2, a value λT ∗ = 2 log
(
2
1+q
)
< 2 log(2) will be high enough to
prevent an attack for any bribe and any acceptable value of p.
4 P{attacker finding and analyzing i blocks before another node mining one}
=
∫ ∞
t=0
pλ exp(−pλt)
(pλt)i−1
(i− 1)!
exp(−(1− p)λ(t+ T ))dt = pi exp(−(1− p)λT )
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Conclusions and Final Remarks
We formalized a simple and effective protocol to generate on demand pseudo random
numbers, in a fully auditable way. We have demonstrated that none of the involved parts
has enough financial incentives to try to affect the random number outcome: the part
that issues the transaction lacks this power, since it does not have any control on the
block header; and the miners do not have enough financial incentives to collude with an
attacker, provided a suitable Verifiable Delay Function is applied.
The essentially decentralized, yet completely traceable and auditable nature of the
protocol presented in this article, makes the resulting randomization process eminently
reliable without recourse of blind trust in any central authority. The authors believe the
adoption of such a protocol by the the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF), as recommended
in Marcondes et al. (2019), would significantly increase public confidence in the judicial
system and be a contributing factor for political and social stability.
Acknowledgments
The authors are grateful for the support received from IME-USP – the Institute of
Mathematics and Statistics of the University of São Paulo and for the advice of Prof.
Serguei Popov. The authors also received support from FAPESP – the State of São
Paulo Research Foundation (grants CEPID-CeMEAI 2013/07375-0 and CEPID-Shell-
RCGI 2014/50279-4); CNPq – the Brazilian National Counsel of Technological and Scien-
tific Development (grant PQ 301206/2011-2 and GD 140490/2016-7); ABJ – the Brazilian
Jurimetrics Association; STF – Supremo Tribunal Federal (the Brazilian Supreme Court),
which motivated the study and provided the data analysed in Marcondes et al. (2019);
the IOTA Foundation; and received helpful comments and advice from Adilson Simonis,
Álvaro Machado Dias, Julio Trecenti, Rafael Bassi Stern and Marcelo Guedes Nunes.
References
Aumasson, Jean-Philippe (2017). Serious Cryptography: A Practical Introduction to
Modern Encryption. No Starch Press.
Basu, D.; Ghosh, J.K. (ed.) (1988), Statistical Information and Likelihood, A Collection
of Essays by Dr.Debabrata Basu, Lecture Notes in Statistics, 45, Springer.
Boneh, D.; Bonneau, J.; Bünz, B.; Fisch, B. Verifiable delay functions. Cryptology ePrint
Archive, Report 2018/601, 2018. https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/601
Bonneau, Joseph, Jeremy Clark, and Steven Goldfeder. On Bitcoin as a public random-
ness source. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive 2015 (2015): 1015.
Boyar, J. (1989). Inferring Sequences Produced by Pseudo-Random Number Generators.
Journal of the ACM, 36, 1, 129-141.
Bruhn, M.; McKenzie, D. (2009). In Pursuit of Balance: Randomization in Practice in
Development Field Experiments. American Economic Journal, Applied economics, 1,
4, 200-232.
5
O. Saa, J.M. Stern Auditable Blockchain Randomization Tool
Fossaluza, V.; Lauretto, M.S.; Pereira, C.A.B.; Stern, J.M. (2015). Combining Opti-
mization and Randomization Approaches for the Design of Clinical Trials. Springer
Proceedings in Mathematics and Statistics, Vol. 118, Ch. 14, p. 173-184.
Gelman, A.; Carlin, J.B.; Stern, H.S.; Rubin, D.B. (2003). Bayesian Data Analysis, 2nd
ed. NY: Chapman and Hall / CRC
Goldschlag, D. M.; Stubblebine S. G. (1998). Publicly Verifiable Lotteries: Applications of
Delaying Functions. p.214-226 in International Conference on Financial Cryptography.
Berlin: Springer.
Haber, S., Stornetta, W. (1991). How to time-stamp a digital document. Journal of
Cryptology. 3 (2): 99–111.
Hammersley, J.M., Handscomb, D.C. (1964). Monte Carlo Methods. London: Chapman
and Hall.
Haramoto, H., M., Matsumoto, T., Nishimura, F., Panneton, and P. L’Ecuyer. 2008.
Efficient Jump Ahead for F2-Linear Random Number Generators. INFORMS Journal
on Computing, 20 (3): 290-298.
Katz, Jonathan; Lindell, Yehuda (2014). Introduction to Modern Cryptography. Chapman
and Hall.
Kelsey, John, et al. (1997). Secure applications of low-entropy keys. International Work-
shop on Information Security. Berlin: Springer.
Knuth, D. E. (1997). The Art of Computer Programming, vol. 2: Seminumerical Algo-
rithms. 3rd ed. Addison-Wesley Longman Publ. Co., Inc., Reading, MA.
Lauretto, M.S.; Nakano, F.; Pereira, C.A.B.; Stern, J.M. (2012). Intentional Sampling by
Goal Optimization with Decoupling by Stochastic Perturbation. American Institute of
Physics Conference Proceedings, 1490, 189-201.
Lauretto, M.S.; Stern, R.B.; Morgan, K.L.; Clark, M.H.; Stern, J.M. (2017). Haphazard
Intentional Sampling and Censored Random Sampling to Improve Covariate Balance
in Experiments. American Institute of Physics Conference Proceedings, 1853, 050003,
1-8.
L’Ecuyer, P. (2012). Random number generation. pp.35-71 in Handbook of Computa-
tional Statistics. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.
Lindley, D.V. The Role of Randomization in Inference. In PSA: Proceedings of the Bien-
nial meeting of the philosophy of science association, pages 431–446. JSTOR, 1982.
Marcondes, D.; Peixoto C.; and Stern, J.M. Assessing Randomness in Case Assign-
ment: The Case Study of the Brazilian Supreme Court. Law, Probability and Risk,
https://doi.org/10.1093/lpr/mgz006 , 2019
Morgan, K.L. and Rubin,D.B. Rerandomization to improve covariate balance in experi-
ments. The Annals of Statistics, 40(2):1263–1282, 2012.
6
O. Saa, J.M. Stern Auditable Blockchain Randomization Tool
Morgan, K.L. and Rubin,D.B. Rerandomization to balance tiers of covariates. Journal of
the American Statistical Association, 110(512):1412–1421, 2015.
Nakamoto, Satoshi (2008). Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System.
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf
Parikh, R.; Pauly, M. (2012). What Is Social Software? pp.3-13 in J.van Eijck et al.
(2012). Games, Actions, and Social Software. LNCS 7010, Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
Pearl, J. Causality: models, reasoning, and inference. Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Pearl, J. (2004). Simpson’s paradox: An anatomy. Tech.Rep., Univ. of California, Los
Angeles.
Pierrot, C.; Wesolowski, B. (2016) Malleability of the blockchain’s entropy.
https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/370.pdf
Popov, Serguei. On a decentralized trustless pseudo-random number generation algo-
rithm. Journal of Mathematical Cryptology 11.1 (2017): 37-43.
Rabin, Michael O. (1983). Transaction protection by beacons. Journal of Computer and
System Sciences 27, 2, 256-267.
Ripley, B.D. (1987). Stochastic Simulation. NY: Wiley.
Ruxton, Graeme D.; Colegrave, Nick (2006). Experimental Design for the Life Sciences,
2nd ed. Sec. 3.4.6 Random samples and Representative Samples, p.59-60.
Stern, Julio Michael (2008). Decoupling, Sparsity, Randomization, and Objective
Bayesian Inference. Cybernetics & Human Knowing, 15, 2, 49-68.
Stern, J. M. (2018) Verstehen (causal/ interpretative understanding), Erklären (law-
governed description/ prediction), and Empirical Legal Studies. Journal of Institutional
and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 174, 105–114.
Suetonius Tranquillus (119CE, 1979). The Lives of the Caesars, Vol.1. Harvard University
Press. Sec.74.2.
Wattenhofer, R. (2017). Distributed Ledger Technology: The Science of Blockchain. In-
verted Forest.
7
